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authority theory, finding that the insurer had done nothing to mislead
the partnership into believing that the limited agent's actions were
authorized.202
Admittedly, the Ford case "test[s] the very outer limits of due
process. "203 In view of the desirability of protecting New York insureds,
however, the Court might have searched further for the "minimum
contacts '20 4 necessary to sustain jurisdiction. The fact that an agent is
not acting within the scope of his authority does not necessitate a hold-
ing that his acts may not be attributed to his principal for jurisdictional
purposes.20 5 Where an insurer does business through an agent of its own
choosing, the New York activities of the latter, although they may not
ultimately be held legally binding, should provide the jurisdictionally
required forum contacts.
DOLE V. Dow CHEMICAL CO.
Intrafamily torts
The rule of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.20 6 is forcing the New York
courts to re-examine intrafamily tort law. One of the most controversial
topics appears to be the negligent supervision Dole claim. 207 This claim
202 1d. at 473, 299 N.E.2d at 664, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
203 39 App. Div. 2d at 571, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 868, citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d
68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 40
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 122, 133 (1965).
204 The requirement of "minimum contacts" was first enunciated in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court therein applied a flexible test of
fairness and reasonableness in determining jurisdiction.
205 In Ford, the Court seemingly made no distinction between the threshold question
of jurisdiction and the merits of the claim. Compare Elman v. Belson, 32 App. Div. 2d
422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961 (2d Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 532, 540 (1970), where the question presented was whether the activities of an
attorney could be attributed to an Illinois domiciliary defendant, the court stated
[tjhere is . . . a genuine and fundamental difference between the court's power to
entertain an action and the determination of the action itself. Whether the
defendant became obligated to the plaintiffs as a result of his attorney's proceedings
conceivably could be decided in any forum having jurisdiction over the parties
but the preliminary question which must be resolved is whether the forum invoked
by the plaintiffs to make that decision has jurisdiction over the parties.
Id. at 424, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 963. While the court found that the acts upon which jurisdic-
tion was predicated were within the attorney's implied authority, it based its decision
on more flexible considerations of fairness. "The final standard for jurisdiction is reason-
ableness -whether the defendant is unfairly burdened by the compulsion to contest a
suit in a forum outside his domicile." Id. at 426, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 965, citing International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
206 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALBANY L. REv.
154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 185 (1972). For an extended
discussion of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. com-
mentary at 205-38 (1972).
207 The question of the permissibility of such claims has been the subject of a great
deal of litigation. See Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (claim
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most frequently arises when the parent of an infant who has been
struck by an automobile208 brings an action in both a representative
and individual capacity against the negligent driver. The driver then
attempts to counterclaim against the parent individually, demanding a
Dole apportionment of any damages recoverable by the child. In cer-
tain situations, an apportionment may also be sought by way of im-
pleader. 20 9 In either case, the theory behind the claim is that the parent
has failed to supervise and protect the infant, thus contributing to his
injury.
The negligent supervision Dole claim has met with varied re-
sponses at the trial level. One point of view is that it is barred by intra-
family immunity. Although this doctrine is widely considered to have
been abolished by the Court of Appeals in Gelbman v. Gelbman,210
some courts have taken the position that it persists as to intrafamily
suits where the parties are not protected by liability insurance.21' In
another line of cases, Dole claims against the parents of injured chil-
dren have been disallowed for failure to allege some "special circum-
stances" 212 requiring the parent to exercise unusual care in supervision.
Recently in Holodook v. Spencer,2 13 the Appellate Division, Third
Department, undertook the most thorough analysis to date of the issue.
allowed); Northrop v. Hogestyn, 75 Misc. 2d 486, 348 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. Ontario
County 1973) (claim disallowed); Searles v. Dardani, 75 Misc. 2d 279, 347 N.Y.S.2d 662
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973) (claim allowed); Kiernan v. Jones, 73 Misc. 2d 829, 342
N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973) (claim disallowed); Hairston v. Broadwater,
73 Misc. 2d 523, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973) (claim disallowed); Fake
v. Terminal Hardware, 73 Misc. 2d 39, 341 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973)
(claim disallowed); Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority,
72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972) (claim disallowed); Bil-
gore v. Rennie, 72 Misc. 2d 639, 340 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct Monroe County 1973) (claim
disallowed); Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972) (claim disallowed). CommentatQrs have expressed differing views on the
issue. See Dachs, Seider v. Roth Upstaged by Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 169 N.Y.L.J. 22,
Jan. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 5; McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 92, May 11,
1973, at 1, col. 1.
208 Although most of the cases involve automobile accidents, the negligent super-
vision Dole claim may arise in other factual situations. See Northrop v. Hogestyn, 75 Misc.
2d 486, 348 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1973) (child injured while using de-
fendant's Iawn mower).
200 The defendant may proceed by third party claim against one or both parents who
are not parties to the action. See Fake v. Terminal Hardware, 73 Misc. 2d 39, 341 N.Y.S.2d
272 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973); Bilgore v. Rennie, 72 Misc. 2d 639, 340 N.Y.S.2d 212
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973).
21023 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
211 See Kiernan v. Jones, 73 Misc. 2d 829, 342 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1973); Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 72 Misc. 2d
946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1972).
212 See, e.g., Marrero v. Just Cab Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972).
213 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973).
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This case involved negligent supervision Dole claims against the parents
of a four-year-old infant who was struck by the defendant's automobile
while running from between parked cars. The trial court had denied a
motion to dismiss the claims,2 14 holding that an action for Dole appor-
tionment should lie "as of right where the infant is non sui juris as a
matter of law,"2 15 and that in other cases the infant's ability to care
for himself should be the subject of proof. The Appellate Division
reversed over one dissent and dismissed the Dole claims as legally in-
sufficient.
In its well-reasoned opinion, the Third Department postulated
that no Dole apportionment claim based upon negligent parental su-
pervision would lie unless a direct child-parent suit could be main-
tained on the same ground.216 Since failure to supervise does not give
rise to liability outside of the family setting, the court concluded that
such a suit could not be maintained. In this connection the court ob-
served that "... Gelbman did not create new torts. Had it done so, the
very family relationship which had previously constituted merely a
defense, would have become a basis for classifying as torts acts or omis-
sions which could not create any liability to the world at large."2 17 Ac-
cordingly, in a case decided contemporaneously with Holodook, Graney
v. Graney, 218 the court affirmed an order dismissing a direct child-
parent suit based on negligent supervision.
Commenting further on the scope of Gelbman, the court in Holo-
dook rejected as too narrow the theory that intrafamily immunity has
been abolished only where liability insurance is present.219 The court
suggested, rather, that Gelbman be read as removing the shield of
immunity with respect to all acts which are considered torts as between
strangers. Such acts were contrasted with parental acts involving the
exercise of discretion or authority. These, the court held, should not
give rise to liability,220 even where "special circumstances" such as a
child's physical or mental defect are shown.221 Emphasis was placed
upon the difficulty in formulating legal standards of reasonableness in
the exercise of parental functions.222
214 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1973).
215 Id. at 183, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
216 43 App. Div. 2d at 131, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
217 Id. at 133, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
218 43 App. Div. 2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't 1973).
219 43 App. Div. 2d at 132, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
220 Id. at 134, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 204, citing Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963).
22143 App. Div. 2d at 137, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
222 Id. at 135, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05.
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The Holodook decision is based upon a.policy against increasing
the burdens of parenthood. In view of the many difficulties encoun-
tered in raising children, a court is naturally reluctant to impose a
monetary liability on a parent who fails to protect a child from injury.
Such a liability seems all the more undesirable in the case of a parent
of a mentally or physically defective child. Nothing should be done to
increase the already enormous burdens of such parents. It is hoped
that the otherwise beneficial Dole rule will not have this unfortunate
effect. Holodook promises that it will not.
Insurance Law § 167(3)
Conflicting decisions continue as to the effect of section 167(3) of
the Insurance Law in the context of a Dole claim for indemnity against
the plaintiff's spouse. The section provides that no liability insurance
policy "shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured
because of death or injury to his or her spouse." 223 The line of division
between the cases has been whether or not the intent of section 167(3)
should be re-examined in light of Dole.224
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Westlake,225
the Supreme Court, Nassau County, refused to do so. In this case, the
defendants against whom the insured and his spouse had brought suit
instituted a third-party action against the insured for apportionment
of his spouse's damages. The insurer thereupon sought a declaration of
its liability under the policy. The court acknowledged that the intent
of section 167(3) was to protect insurance companies from collusive
actions between spouses,2261 and that the possibility of collusion is vir-
tually nonexistent in this situation because the insured spouse would
have to succeed in her action before the defendant's indemnity claim
against the insured arose.227 Reading the statute broadly, however, the
223 N.Y. INS. LA.,.W § 167(3) (McKinney 1966).
224 Compare Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Delosh, 73 Misc. 2d 275, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup.
Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973) (holding section 167(3) inapplicable) with Perno v. Ex-
change Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 346, 342 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973),
and Smith v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1972) (holding section 167(8) applicable).
225 74 Misc. 2d 604, 344 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
226 Id. at 605, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 68, quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d
1, 7, 143 N.E2d 357, 360, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1957).
227 Where both spouses are suing on their own behalf, the one against whom indemnity
is sought generally has nothing to gain by deliberately losing the lawsuit because, although
he may be bolstering his spouse's claim, he is defeating his own. It may, however, be worth-
while to do so where his injuries are minor and his spouse's are extensive. See McLaughlin,
New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 109, Dec. 8, 1972, at 5, Col. 1-2.
This is, however, distinguishable from the situation in which the spouse against whom
indemnity is sought is not a party-plaintiff to the action. In this case, he has an interest
19741
